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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: PRIVATE-PLACEMENT
ADOPTIONS
Due to the increasing interest being man-
ifested today in social work policy and the
concomitant concern over child welfare,
there has been a resurgence of activity on
the part of state legislatures in the area of
adoption. One of the foremost problems
has been the formulation of legislation reg-
ulating non-agency, more commonly termed
private-placement, adoptions. There has
been a noticeable sparsity of statistical and
other necessary materials in the adoption
field with the result that the legislation in
many of the states has been approached
from an experimental standpoint. One of
the most recent approaches as exemplified
by the recent amendment of New York's
adoption law will be explored in this -note
and contrasted with the Uniform Adoption
Act and several other major approaches
taken by various states. This analysis will
be made in an attempt to point up the
manifold problems and varying solutions
which are present in this area.
It has been estimated that there are some
75,000 adoption petitions filed annually in
the courts of the United States and that
this figure represents an increase of more
than 500 per cent over the level of twenty
years ago.' During the last decade the adop-
tion laws of several of the states have been
undergoing drastic revisions. In New York,
the legislature has recently amended the
I GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 241 (1954).
adoption statute2 so that a new two-stage
private-placement procedure is now opera-
tive.3 This new statute became effective
September 1, 1961.
Procedure Under the New York Statute
Article VII of the Domestic Relations
Law has been rearranged and modified so
that there is now established a separate and
distinct procedure for private-placement
adoptions. The new procedure is put into
operation by the filing of the petition,
agreement and consents of adoption with
the court.4 At this time the judge, upon a
finding that there has been proper compli-
ance with the statutory prerequisites and
that the adoption may be in the child's best
interests, must order an investigation to be
made by a disinterested person or an au-
thorized agency. 5 This report must be sub-
mitted to the judge within thirty days after
the order of investigation has been made6
and must include a minimum of informa-
tion relating to six specific areas.7 If the
report is favorable, there is a six-month
2 Adoption is defined in the New York statute as
"the legal proceeding whereby a person takes an-
other person into the relation of child and thereby
incurs the responsibilities of parent in respect of
such other person." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110.
3 Private-placement adoption is defined as "any
adoption other than that of a minor who has been
placed for adoption by an authorized agency."
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 109(5).
4 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(2).
5 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(3).
6 Ibid. "[U]nless for good cause shown the judge
or surrogate shall grant a reasonable extension of
such period." Ibid.
7 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(3).
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waiting period from the time of the filing
of the petition for adoption.8 Then, if the
requirements of the statute have been com-
plied with and it has been determined that
the interests of the child will be promoted
by the adoption, a final order of adoption
will be granted pursuant to Section 114 of
the Domestic Relations Law.9 There has
been no change in the provisions relative
to the actual issuance of a final order of
adoption.10
However, if it should appear from the
investigation that the proposed adoption is
an unsuitable arrangement, the judge now
has the authority in his discretion to re-
move the child from the foster home and
return him either to his natural parents or
an authorized agency, or to transfer the
child to a court having- jurisdiction over
neglected children."
Section 373 of the Social Welfare Law,
which provides that the court give custody
of the child to persons of the same reli-
gious faith "when practicable," has been
incorporated into Section 110 of the Do-
mestic Relations Law. 12 This provision was
formerly contained only in Section 113 of
the Domestic Relations Law, which re-
ferred solely to adoptions from authorized
agencies. Now there is an express refer-
ence to the applicability of the provision to
private-placement adoptions. 13
8 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(1).
9 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(4).
10 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114.
11 N.Y. DOM REL. LAW § 116(2).
12 This incorporation of the provisions of § 373 of
the Social Welfare Law into § 110 of the Domestic
Relations Law only expresses what has always
been the law. It was enacted only after the Gover-
nor gave assurance that no change had been made
in existing law. See Governor's Message, March
17, 1961, reprinted in McKinney's N. Y. Sess.
Laws 1961, p. 2079.
'3 The Court of Appeals of New York had held
that § 373 was applicable to private-placement as
The Investigation
The New York adoption law first re-
quired in 1924 that an investigation be
made by either the court itself or by a
person selected by the court.14 By the pro-
visions of that former statute the investi-
gation could be made by a person, an
agency or by the judge himself if he so
desired. When pursuant to the former stat-
ute the judge had taken the investigation
upon himself, it often resulted in a per-
functory analysis of the situation.' 5 On the
other hand, since there was no provision
that a person designated by the court be
disinterested, there was always the problem
of the judge appointing the attorney for the
petitioner to make the investigation.',
Under the new adoption law, the investi-
gation can no longer be made by the judge,
but must be made either by a disinterested
person or by an authorized agency.' 7 Thus,
both of the above problems have been elim-
inated. One possible omission in the amend-
ment is that no minimum standards have
been established for the qualifications of
the investigator and there remains the pos-
sibility that an unqualified investigator may
well as agency adoptions. In the Matter of the
Adoption of Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d
848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). See N. Y. Times,
March 17, 1961, p. 30, col. 5. In the situation
where a mother consents to an adoption of her
child by a family of another faith it would seem
that the court would have to give it effect.
14 See GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 240 (1954).
15 See Note, 59 YALE L.J. 715 (1950). "Judges
have neither the time nor the training to make the
investigation themselves. When the matter is left
entirely in their hands, adoption petitions are often
filed and granted in a single day." Id. at 729-30.
See also 1959 N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, REPORT OF
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON MATRIMONIAL
AND FAMILY LAWS 22 [hereinafter cited as 1959
N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44].
16 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 25.
17 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(3).
be selected.' 8 The aforementioned possi-
bility is somewhat alleviated by the present
requirement of a minimum amount of in-
formation in the written report of the
investigator. 19 The following information is
specifically required: (1) the marital and
family status of the foster parents and child;
(2) their physical and mental health; (3)
the property and income of the foster par-
ents; (4) the compensation paid with re-
spect to the placement of the child; (5)
whether either foster parent was ever a
respondent in any proceeding involving
neglected, abandoned or delinquent chil-
dren; and (6) "any other facts relating to
the familial, social, religious, emotional and
financial circumstances of the foster par-
ents which may be relevant to a determi-
nation of adoption. '20 It can be noted that
the information which must be included in
the report is of a comprehensive nature and
should go quite far in assisting the judge in
making a final determination as to the ad-
visability of the proposed adoption.21
The Waiting Period
In 1924 the legislature established the
necessity of a six-month residence of the
child in the foster home before there could
be a final order of adoption. 22 However
court supervision of a private-placement
could only be effected by the filing of a
petition for adoption. Conceivably, there-
fore, a child could remain in a foster home
Is The statute simply says that the judge or sur-
rogate shall select a disinterested person who in
the opinion of the court "is qualified by training
and experience .... ." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 116(3). But see 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44,
at 25 for some reasons why no standards were
established.19 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(3).
20 Ibid.
21 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 23.
22 See GELLHORN, supra note 14, at 240.
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for months or even years before a court
could gain supervision of the proposed
adoption. 23 Once the court did acquire su-
pervision a final order of adoption could
be made at any time. The problem was that
strong emotional ties had often attached by
the time the court received an investigation
report and there was a reluctance to inter-
fere with the existing arrangements, even if
the investigation uncovered an unsuitable
home. 24
Under the new law there is a six-month
residency requirement which goes into ef-
fect only after the child has been received
and the petition has been filed. 25 In the
usual case a final order of adoption cannot'
be made until six months after the petition
has been filed.26 Therefore, under old and
present law, there is only one six-month
residence requirement for private-place-
ments, but now the period of residency
goes into effect after the filing of the
petition.27 The court is also authorized
under the new statute to issue a final order
of adoption in less than six months if in
23 See Lukas, Babies Are Neither Vendible Nor
Expendible, 5 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 88, 103
(1950).
24 See GELLHORN, supra note 14, at 249-50; Lukas,
supra note 23, at 104. Compare Cox, Pennsyl-
vania's Need - An Adequate Protective Adoption
Placement Program, 22 PA. B.A.Q. 154 (1951).
"A judge, faced with this realistic situation, has
no choice but to decree its adoption. It is only
when the disqualification of the petitioners to be
adequate parents is so gross as to demonstrate
beyond question that the adoption of the child
would not be for its best interests that it is re-
fused." Id. at 157.
2 5 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(1).
26 The residency requirements only have applica-
tion where the foster child is less than eighteen
years of age. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 116(1).
27 "The judge or surrogate may shorten such wait-
ing period for good cause shown, and, in such
case the order of adoption shall recite the reason
for such action." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(1).
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the court's discretion the situation war-
rants it.
The purpose of having a six-month wait-
ing period after the filing of the petition
is to induce adoptive parents to apply
promptly, thereby insuring an early investi-
gation. 28 Foster parents will now be able to
have a final order of adoption in six months
and one day from the time the child is
privately placed in their home if they file
their petition immediately after the place-
ment, and the time may be shortened by
the judge for good cause. 29 This incentive,
if effective, would give the judge an earlier
look at the situation and an opportunity to
correct it if undesirable.
The new provision would seem to indi-
cate that there will be a more expedient
judicial supervision of the adoption at the
commencement of the procedure and a
commensurate lessening of the risk of plac-
ing the child in an unhealthy environment. 30
However, one of the greatest problems in
this area remains essentially unanswered.
Foster parents may still keep the child in
their home for an extended period of time
before filing their petition, since there is no
mandatory requirement as to the immediate
filing of a petition. 3' If this occurs, emo-
tional and sentimental ties will have been
formed and the courts will be in the iden-
tical dilemma as they were prior to the
amendment.
Court Removal of Child
From Unsuitable Home
When the investigation had been com-
pleted under the old procedure and it had
28 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 27, REPORT OF
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON MATRIMONIAL
AND FAMILY LAWS 21 [hereinafter cited as 1960
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 27].
29 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc; No. 44, at 23.
30 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 27, at 21.
31 See Lukas, supra note 23, at 103.
been determined that the foster home was
unsuitable for adoption purposes, the
court's interest would end there. This led
to the problematical result that the child
would often remain in the custody of unfit
persons. 32 The only remedy available was
to have the child deemed "neglected," in
the sense of being in an improper or un-
wholesome custody, and therewith give him
over to Children's Court jurisdiction to be
placed more appropriately. 33 A recent
amendment to the Children's Court Act
provides that a child can be removed from
the foster home as a "neglected" child, if
the home is not suitable for his moral and
temporal interests. 34 Even under these pro-
visions there is always the question of who
would know of the undesirable arrange-
ments, or if they are known, who would
suggest the commencement of this type of
procedure.
This difficulty has been somewhat ame-
liorated by the new statute which empowers
the judge to remove the child from the
foster home when the court is satisfied that
the welfare of the child requires it.3 5 After
the determination has been made to remove
the child, the judge may now give him over
to a natural parent or an authorized agency
or transfer him to a court having jurisdic-
tion of neglected children. 36
32 See GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 265 (1954).
33 Ibid.
34 In § 2 of the New York Children's Court Act a
neglected child is defined as "a permanently placed
child . . . whose care, control, or custody by the
person with whom such child is permanently
placed is contrary to the moral and temporal in-
terest of such child." Subdivision 12 of this section
defines what is meant by a "permanently placed"
child. See also N. Y. C. DOM. REL. CT. AcT
§ 2(23), (17)(j), where substantially the same
provisions are applicable to New York City.
35 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 116(2).
36 Ibid.
Other problems arise when the court re-
moves a child from an unfit home and
places him with an authorized agency. If
the child is placed with the agency for
purposes of adoption there would seem to
be no objection. But where the court places
him in an agency for the purposes of long-
term foster care, it would seem that one of
the purposes of the statute would be
thwarted since the end result would be a
child who would be without the benefits of
adoptive parents.
Another anomolous situation develops
where the home of the foster parents is
suitable, but the adoption is denied on
grounds such as religious difference. If the
natural parent in this situation would want
her child to remain in the custody of the
foster family, it would seem questionable
whether the judge should order a removal,
since if he did, the child might very well be
placed with some family not selected and
approved by the natural parents.
The Problem of Unsupervised
Private-Placements
At the outset it should be noted that a
child may be privately placed either with
an intention ultimately to adopt or without
such an intention. But court supervision of
such placements, and the accompanying
power of a judge under the new law to
remove a child from an unfit home, de-
pend upon a petition for adoption being
filed. Hence, a dual problem exists in this
area. Clearly, if no intention to adopt ex-
ists, no such supervision is possible. How-
ever, even if there is an ultimate intention
to adopt, the fact is that should the parties
postpone filing a petition for adoption, the
supervision of the court will come only
after a lapse of time and the reluctance to
remove a child once attachments have
formed becomes a factor.
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There appear to be two major trends of
thought as to the means which should be
employed in order to insure that a child
will not be privately placed for adoption in
an inimical environment and left there with-
out any supervision by either the courts or
other qualified agencies.
One solution which has been proposed
calls for the channelling of all adoptions
through public or private agencies with the
resulting elimination of all private-place-
ment adoptions.37 This position has been
criticized as being pragmatically impossi-
ble3" with the strong suggestion that, if all
families who normally turn to private-
placement adoptions were to turn to agen-
cies, the agencies would be without the
facilities to handle them.39 Three other ob-
jections proferred against the institutional-
izing of the adoption process include the
fear of a monopoly by authorized agencies
in an area in which many believe that pri-
vate-placements operate equally well; the
fear of ultimate encroachment by the state
into the practices and policies of voluntary
agencies; and the notion that a mother has
an unqualified right to delegate the care
and to transfer the custody of her child to
whomsoever she desires.40 Some states have
already taken the necessary statutory steps
in order to institutionalize their adoption
processes, but evasion is quite common and
37 Cox, Pennsylvania's Need - An Adequate Pro-
tective Adoption Placement Program, 22 PA.
B.A.Q. 154 (1951). "The placement of children
for adoption requires resources not possessed by
any individual. It should be undertaken only by
organizations which can adequately provide the
knowledge and the skill necessary ..... Id. at 160.
See also Note, 15 U. Prrr. L. REV. 150, 152
(1953).
39 See Lukas, Babies Are Neither Vendible Nor
Expendible, 5 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 88, 106
(1950).
39 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 413.
40 See Lukas, supra note 38, at 106.
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there are very few prosecutions brought
against persons who circumvent these stat-
utes by privately placing a child with a
stranger. 4
1
A second proposed solution calls for a
mandatory public registration of every
placement made for the purpose of adop-
tion. 42 It has been argued in favor of this
type of provision that such a registration,
coupled with a requirement that the regis-
tered family appear before the court imme-
diately thereafter, would have the following
benefits: (1) the placement would be
brought to the attention of the court at an
early stage in the adoption process; (2) the
court could request an immediate study of
the proposed home and of the adoptability
of the child; (3) the early report would
allow the judge to come to a decision as to
the advisability of having the child remain
in the foster home for the balance of the
period of probation; (4) the court could
have the child and the foster family super-
vised by qualified personnel; (5) if the
preliminary investigation indicated an un-
suitable placement then the judge could
order the child removed before close bonds
of attachments took place; 43 (6) necessary
statistics would be made available to the
legislature to evaluate the situation with
respect to children privately placed for the
purpose of adoption. 44
Opponents of a measure such as this
41 See GELLHORN, supra note 32, at 251.
42 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 348. See
Lukas, supra note 38, at 106.
43 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 348.
44 Id. at 355-59. A child registry bill was proposed
in the state legislature in 1959 and it provided for
a two year temporary registry which would serve
to determine the amount of children informally
and privately placed outside the family circle in
New York State. It was defeated overwhelmingly.
S. Int. 1630, Pr. 1675, A. Int. 2182, Pr. 2205
(1959).
have argued that the additional mainte-
nance of files and an investigation staff
would not be feasible since there is pres-
ently not enough staff time available to
serve all of the children known.45 It has
also been pointed out that there is a great
lack of qualified personnel to work in this
area 6 and that the prospects for the future
are not bright, since there is little incentive
to enter this field due to the unappealing
remunerative benefits involved.4 7 An addi-
tional objection cited the possibility that a
public registry would lead to the taking of
children, particularly those born out of
wedlock, into other jurisdictions where the
law would not require a public recordation
of the proposed surrender. 48 It would seem
that in the case of an illegitimate child, the
mother would seek as little publicity as
possible and that a public registration
would only complicate and magnify her
plight. Thus the real possibility develops
that she might seek refuge in a jurisdiction
where the laws are more lenient and more
amenable to her particular situation.4 9
Neither of these proposed solutions are
intended to nor are they geared to solve the
problem of an unsupervised private-place-
ment, where there is no intention to adopt
the child. This is basically a social problem
and it is presently dealt with by Section 2
of the Children's Court Act. That section
provides that a child, whether turned over
45 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 301.
46 1960 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 27, at 22.
47 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 25.
48 Id. at 328.
49 At the present time § 398(6) of the Social Wel-
fare Law makes it relatively simple for a mother
to surrender her illegitimate child to the Depart-
ment of Welfare. If she makes an absolute sur-
render she is relieved of financial responsibility as
are her parents. This is all accomplished with as
little notoriety as possible. 1959 N.Y. LEG. Doc.
No. 44, at 414-15.
for adoption purposes or not by the parent,
can be removed as a "neglected" child if
the foster home is not suitable for the moral
and temporal interests of the child.
The question is then posed whether there
should be legislation passed applying to
children who are privately placed in a home
where there is no intention to adopt, or
whether this problem should be handled by
the appropriate sections of the Children's
Court Act. If new legislation is the answer,
then a possible solution lies in a mandatory
public registration of all private-placements
irrespective of the intention.5"
In the event of such legislation the ob-
jections to a public registration of private-
placements for the purpose of adoption
would seem to be equally applicable here.
It is also interesting to note that Section 197
of the Sanitary Code,51 repealed in 1959,
required that anyone, other than an au-
thorized agency, public officer or relative
within the second degree of the child's par-
ents, who received a child under sixteen
years of age, obtain a permit issued by the
Board of Health. This section, on the sur-
face, would seem to have fulfilled part of
the need which has been voiced for a public
registration. But this statute was apparently
ignored and the likely argument has been
put forth that if people will not follow ex-
isting provisions in this sphere, nothing will
make them abide by a new provision which
would be essentially the same in many
respects.5 2
Other problems would also arise under
50 See Lukas, Babies Are Neither Vendible Nor
Expendible, 5 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 88, 106
(1950).
51 N.Y.C. Sanitary Code of 1943. The Sanitary
Code was incorporated into the revised New York
City Health Code in 1959, and at that time § 197
was omitted.
52 1959 N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 44, at 397.
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a mandatory public registration system. For
example, the public would have to be edu-
cated to this new status of the law. In addi-
tion, the nature of the sanctions to be
imposed in case of noncompliance would
have to be given serious thought.53 This is
certainly a troublesome area and it seems
that no panacea has yet been discovered.
Comparison With Other Adoption Statutes
The Uniform Adoption Act
The Uniform Adoption Act which was
drafted in 1953 has been described as a
compromise between competing groups,
one wanting to give a high degree of con-
trol over placement to welfare departments
and social work agencies and the other
preferring to put a high degree of discre-
tionary control in the courts.5 4
Initially the act calls for an investigation
to be made upon the filing of the petition
for adoption. 55 This investigation may be
made by an agency or by a person desig-
nated by the court, although it is not neces-
sarily stipulated that this person be disin-
terested.56 No more than sixty days from
the issuance of the order of investigation,
the report of this investigation must be filed
with the court.57 As does the New York
statute, the Uniform Act requires certain
specific elements which the investigation
must uncover and which are to be con-
tained in the report.58 It is further provided
53 Id. at 415-16.
54 See Merrill & Merrill, Toward Uniformity in
Adoption Law, 40 IowA L. REV. 299, 326 (1955).
55 UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 9(1).
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid. The elements required by the Uniform
Adoption Act are not nearly as particular or ex-
tensive as those required in § 116(3) of the New
York Domestic Relations Law. The Uniform Act
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in the act that the court in its discretion
may order separate investigations on sepa-
rate parts of this inquiry.59 The investigator
himself is required to make a definite rec-
ommendation for or against the proposed
adoption and state his reasons for such. 0°
After the examination of the preliminary
report and after the hearing, the court may
issue an interlocutory decree giving the pe-
titioners custody of the child."' The investi-
gator is then required to observe the child
in the home for six months and then make
a final report in writing of his findings to
the court.0 2 Thereafter a date is set for a
final hearing and at this time the court may
enter a final decree of adoption if it is in
the best interests of the child. 3 However,
if it has been determined upon examination
of the preliminary report that the adoption
is in the best interests of the child, the court
may, in its discretion, waive the entry of an
interlocutory decree and the waiting period
of six months, and grant a final decree. 4
No placement procedure has been incor-
porated into the act, but it is the feeling of
some that since this is a Uniform Act the
mechanical aspects of placement should be
left to separate state legislation. 5 One ob-
vious distinction between the provisions of
the Uniform Adoption Act and the amended
provisions of the New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law is that there is no power given to
the court under the Uniform Act to remove
requires only that an investigation be made into
(a) the adoptability of the child, (b) the suita-
bility of the home, and (c) any other pertinent
circumstances.
59 UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 9(2).
60 UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 9(3).
61 UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 11.
02 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 10.
65 See Merrill & Merrill, Toward Uniformity in
Adoption Law, 40 IOWA L. REv. 299, 326 (1955).
a child from a home when on final hearing
the petition for adoption is denied. On a
closer analysis it may. be noted that the
Uniform Act does not contend with the
problem of a child's being placed in a foster
home where the adopting parents wait sev-
eral months or even years before filing a
petition of adoption. There also remains
unanswered the case of a child being pri-
vately placed in a home for non-adoptive
purposes.
It appears as though the Uniform Act is
of little significance as a guide to the basic
problems in this uneasy and uncertain area
of adoption. 0 Possibly because of its more
recent vintage, the New York approach
seems to go much further in attempting to
find some adequate solutions for the mani-
fold problems in this field than does the
Uniform Adoption Act.
State Legislation
Over the past several years many states
have adopted varying approaches to the
highly experimental and complex field of
adoption legislation. In California, since
there was a heavy gravitation towards pub-
lic agency adoptions, the function'of plac-
ing children for adoption has been vested
by statute in licensed agencies. 7 Observa-
tion has shown that evasion of this require-
ment is easily possible and there are almost
no prosecutions for violations of the stat-
ute. 8 This statute also contains a separate
00 "The members of the New York State Commis-
sion on Uniform State Laws did not and do not
believe the Uniform Adoption Act to be a suitable
substitute for the article on adoption in the New
York Domestic Relations Law." 1959 N. Y. LEG.
Doc. No. 44, at 280.
7 See tenBroek, California's Adoption Law and
Programs, 6 HASTINGS L.J. 261, 262-63 (1955).
A parent still has the right to place his child with-
out violating the statute. CAL. CIV. CODE §224(q).
08 See tenflroek, supra note 67, at 335-36.
provision relating to the removal of the
child from the adoptive home and his sub-
sequent placement if the petition of adop-
tion is denied upon final hearing.69
Several other states have taken the nec-
essary statutory steps to restrict private-
placement adoptions. 70 These statutes, how-
ever, have been largely disregarded and
there have been very infrequent prosecu-
tions for violations. 71
In the recent revisions of the Illinois 72
and Pennsylvania 3 adoption laws another
approach has been taken requiring the pe-
tition of adoption to be filed within thirty
days after the child has become available
to the adopting parents. 74 In Illinois, if the
petition is filed later than thirty days, the
burden is thrust upon the petitioner to show
the court that this delay was not due to his
culpable negligence. 75 There is no require-
ment with respect to removal and subse-
quent placement in the Illinois statute.
These statutes also contain provisions simi-
lar to New York's relating to investigation
and specification of material information in
the report.7 6 Both Illinois and Pennsylvania
69 CAL. CIV. CODE § 226(c).
70 See, e.g., GA. CODE § 74-421 (Supp. 1958) (un-
lawful for nonauthorized agencies to place chil-
dren); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-19 (1960) (only a
natural or adopting parent may privately place a
child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-135 (1955) (pri-
vate-placements unlawful and an attempted viola-
tion may be restrained by injunction).
71 See GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE
COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 251 (1954).
72 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1 to 12.5 (Smith-
Hurd 1960).
73 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 1-6 (Supp. 1960). See
Note, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1954). See also
Note, 15 U. PITT. L. REV. 150 (1953).
74 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-5 (Smith-Hurd
1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,§ 1(C) (Supp. 1960).
75 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §9.1-5 (Smith-Hurd
1960).
76 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, §9.1-6 (Smith-Hurd
1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1(C) (Supp. 1960).
8 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1962
retain a six-month residency requirement
before an adoption may be completed.77 In
some states a slightly different procedure
has been developed requiring judicial or
administrative approval to be obtained be-
fore a private-placement adoption may be
made. 78
Since this area is one which is laden with
speculation and conjecture, it would be
most helpful to have accurate and compre-
hensive statistics showing the relative suc-
cess of the varying adoption laws of the
several states. With the conclusions to be
drawn from statistics such as these it is
very possible that much of the experimenta-
tion taking place today in the law of adop-
tion could be eliminated and a sound and
workab'e approach could be formulated.
Conclusion
It would appear upon analysis that the
amendments to New York law with respect
to private-placement adoptions have been,
to some degree, a step forward in the im-
provement of adoption procedure. Remain-
ing unsolved are certain problems such as
the lack of a mandatory time period within
which the petition of adoption must be filed
and also some basic difficulties involved in
unsupervised private-placements. If effec-
tive legislation responding to these prob-
lems could be passed it would seem that
most of the major objections to the present
private-placement measures would be met.
Considering the fact that the lives of chil-
dren are being dealt with here it would
seem imperative that an expeditious solu-
tion for these problems be forthcoming.
77 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-14 (Smith-Hurd
1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §4 (Supp. 1960).
78 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (1952);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.08 (Baldwin 1958).
